INTRODUCTION
Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2014] TRENDS IN FREE TRADE 315 V reflects upon Jordan's trade policy and agreements and provides observations thereon. This Article concludes that Jordan's agreements were largely politically driven, and that in the course of crafting its trade agreements, Jordan often gave up some of the flexibility that it would have been afforded under the multilateral trading system. Accordingly, after more than a decade of active regionalization, Jordan's trade and economic balances remain, unsurprisingly, negative.
I. THE WTO LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Provided certain conditions are met, WTO Members are allowed to enter into preferential arrangements that depart from the most-favorednation (MFN) treatment. 11 In the 1940s, the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules for RTAs were introduced. 12 At that time, little attention was given to non-tariff measures and, more importantly, it was not expected that the exception embodied in GATT Article XXIV would be heavily invoked. 13 That understanding was valid, since the number of existing RTAs at that time was insignificant. 14 Though the creation of GATT in 1948 did not rescind previous bilateral agreements, it did introduce a new reality: agreements had to be brought into accordance with the rules of the GATT or any exceptions thereunder. This grandfathering process materialized most notably in preferential treatment between trading partners; accordingly, many colonial powers, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and the Netherlands, maintained their preferential trade agreements with their respective colonies. 15 The RTA tsunami occurred in the 1990s, particularly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the creation of the WTO in 1995. 16 Not only did the number of RTAs skyrocket, 17 but the coverage of RTAs also became more extensive, expanding to include non-tariff barriers with respect to 316 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
[Vol. 24:2 trade-in goods, 18 as well as services, intellectual property, and investment. 19 These agreements have also substantively expanded to encompass items on competition policy, government procurement, labor and environmental standards, electronic commerce, and human rights. 20 The essence of the rules of the global trading system reflects the principles of non-discrimination. The preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization clearly states that one of the main objectives of the Organization is to promote "entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations." 21 The principles of non-discrimination are substantive legal obligations placed on all WTO Members and are reflected in numerous provisions of the WTO Agreement.
In WTO law, there are two main concepts of non-discrimination: 1) the most-favored-nation treatment obligation (MFN); and 2) the national treatment obligation (NT). 22 In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the principle of MFN is set out in article I and also appears in various forms in articles II.1, V.5, IX.1, and XIII.1, while the principle of NT appears in article III. 23 In the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), article II sets out the principle of MFN and article XVII sets out that of NT. 24 In the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the principles of MFN and NT are found in articles 3 and 4, respectively. 25 These two key principles are also found in 18 26 However, WTO Members are permitted to depart from the non-discrimination rules under specific conditions, which vary depending on the level of integration sought, mainly according to article XXIV of the GATT, article V of the GATS for MFN and the Tokyo Round's Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause). 27 It was initially hoped that GATT Article XXIV would be the system's instrument for "both managing RTAs and encouraging their transformation into multilateral GATT trade agreements" 28 and that was applicable also to Article V of the GATS. However, many view RTAs' proliferation, which has resulted in RTAs constituting an essential portion of the world trade, as a threat to the multilateral system itself. 29 RTAs are recognized as reciprocal trade agreements between two or more partners and include FTAs, CUs, and common markets. 30 PTAs in the WTO "are unilateral trade preferences," that include the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes, as well as other non-reciprocal preferential schemes granted a waiver by the WTO General Council 31 pursuant to Article IX (Decision Making) of the WTO Agreement. 32 26. See e.g., GATT, supra note 11, art. I, ¶ 1 (regarding the principle of nondiscrimination, stating that members "shall unconditionally offer to all other contracting parties (members) any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity affecting customs duties, charges, rules and procedures that they give to products originating in or destined for any other country."). 27 29. See Welcome to the Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS), supra note 6. The recent proliferation of RTAs in the form of free trade agreements demonstrates countries' favoritism of these over customs unions. Welcome to the Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS), supra note 6. This suggests that if the GATT framers had been aware of the potential use of Article XXIV, they would have included a customs union-only requisite, something that might have deterred many of current Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are the most popular mode of regionalism. FTAs encompass an arrangement that allows for the unimpeded flow of trade in goods between members at either a very low, or a zero tariff rate, subject to the conditions of the specified rules of origin. 33 FTAs have proliferated mainly because they offer flexibility to their members. 34 These agreements do not entail the mandatory adoption of similar trade policies; they simply require economic compatibility and probably political compatibility as well. 35 While the conventional form of FTAs simply liberalizes trade in goods, these agreements have taken many forms that vary from this basic model, such as FTAs that contain provisions on investment, as in the NAFTA, or FTAs that encompass non-trade issues related to human rights and democracy, as in several EU agreements. 36 When members of FTAs wish to achieve deeper economic integration, they can adopt common external tariff rates, commonly termed "customs unions." 37 If members of a customs union allow the unimpeded movement of products, capital, and people, then the customs union becomes a common market. 38 Monetary union is another deeper integration model tariff treatment by developing countries for exports from the least developed countries. Id. The waiver would effectively provide a legal cover to those initiatives pledged and engaged in by several developing countries to facilitate market access for the least developed countries. Id. The waiver authorizes derogation from the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle until June 30, 2009 by developing country WTO members that grant unilateral preferential tariff treatment to products imported from the least developed countries members. See Decision on Waiver, Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, WT/L/304 (June 17, 1999) (adopted June 15, 1999); Request for Extension of Waiver, European Communities-Autonomous Preferential Treatment to the Countries of the Western Balkans, G/C/W/552; G/C/W/556 (May 5, 2006) . Examples of preferential trade agreement include the Lomé IV Agreement, preferential arrangements for the Caribbean by the United States and Canada, or a recently agreed waiver permitting more advanced developing countries to extend duty-free preferences on a non-reciprocal basis to LDCs. [Vol. 24:2 Agreements (CRTA) to oversee all RTAs and to consider the implications of such agreements on the multilateral trading system. 48 However, the CRTA proved unable to effectively carry out its duties of examining the consistency of RTAs with RTA rules and overseeing their implementation. 49 In this light, WTO Members agreed in July 2006 on a new mechanism for transparency that drew specific guidelines for reporting RTAs and outlined clear timetables for that purpose. 50 This Transparency Mechanism enables the WTO Secretariat to assume the guiding role in addressing the factual aspects of the notified agreements. 51
II. OVERVIEW OF JORDAN'S FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
Jordan's preferential trade initiatives began to evolve in the late 1950s. In 1962, Jordan entered into an economic cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia to exempt specific products from duties according to each country's ability. 52 Jordan also signed agreements with India in 1964, Iraq in 1967, and a cooperation agreement with the European Communities that entered into force in 1977. 53 The latter specifically allowed Jordan to export some agricultural products with reduced tariffs. 54 The foregoing agreements were all exclusive to goods. 55 Other regional agreements took place under the Umbrella of the Council of Arab Economic Unity, but with limited success. 56 In the early 1970s, Jordan strengthened its Import Substitution Industrialization Strategy, originally implemented in the mid-1950s, which aimed at diversifying the industrial base of the economy. 57 
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introduced several tariff and non-tariff barriers including financial subsidies to local producers, particularly the smaller ones. 58 However, due to the expansionary policies and the nearly unlimited external borrowing the government followed at the time, the total public debt had grown significantly and the government became unable to respond to its debt obligations. 59 To deal with the struggling economy, Jordan had to defer to the IMF and the World Bank, which required Jordan to adopt comprehensive measures, including reducing import restrictions and eliminating domestic subsidies. 60 By 1999, the import weighted average tariff rate had declined to 25 percent, down from 35 percent in 1987. 61 The maximum tariff rate was also reduced from 70 percent in 1993 to 35 percent in 1999, to reach on average 8.98 percent by 2010. 62 In 2000, the Government announced that it accelerated economic "reforms" through further privatization and trade liberalization measures including the introduction of a 10 percent sales tax for the first time. 63 The sales tax rate increased to 16 percent in 2004, and the weighted average tariff rate fell from 35 percent in 1987 to 13.5 percent in 2000, with the maximum tariff rate declining to 30 percent. 64 By the end of 2000, Jordan had joined the WTO in record time, and by 2001, Jordan had signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, after signing an Association Agreement with the European Community in 1997. 65 Regionally, Jordan was a member of various agreements that promoted economic cooperation between Arab states, such as the Agreement for Facilitating and Developing Trade Exchange among Arab States, which was later replaced with the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA). 66 In several areas, Jordan introduced legislation that was compatible with its liberalization policy, including, inter alia, legislation addressing 71 Similarly, Jordan has expedited clearance times by using the current ASYCUDA in most of its customs houses. 72 Jordan also has an MOU with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), as "[a] preliminary step towards full membership . . . ." 73 At the multilateral level, and in line with accession commitments, 74 Jordan has signed the WTO Information Technology Agreement and is currently in an advanced stage of negotiations for its accession to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). 75 Jordan also supported the unsuccessful Doha Agenda, which aimed to remove export subsidies and allowed developing countries to designate special and sensitive products, in addition to creating a new regime for safeguards to phase out export subsidies by 2015. 76 67. For a list of these laws, see Jordan (62 Texts 
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In 2005, Jordan developed its 10-year National Agenda (2006-2015), a long-term development plan that primarily aims to improve the quality of life for Jordanians through the creation of income-generating opportunities, increased standards of living, and guarantees of social welfare. 77 These initiatives are to be undertaken over three consecutive phases and developed along three main dimensions: Government and Policies, Basic Rights and Freedoms, Services, Infrastructure, and Economic Sectors. 78 Under the latter dimension, the Jordanian Ministry of Industry and Trade developed a National Foreign Trade Strategy (2010-2014), which, along with the Industrial Support Programme, was approved by the Council of Ministers in May of 2010. 79 The National Foreign Trade Strategy aims to increase consistency and harmony with other policies and sectoral strategies, both those in place and under preparation, as well as ensuring that these strategies are in accordance with the goals and objectives of the National Agenda (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . 80 These strategies include the Agriculture Strategy, the National Transportation Strategy, the National Tourism Strategy, the Ecommerce Strategy, the strategy of the Ministry of Environment ("approach towards the green economy"), and the National Industrial Policy. 81
III. JORDAN'S TRADE LIBERALIZATION ARRANGEMENTS
Regionally, Jordan has the highest number of free trade and preferential market access agreements when compared to other Arab countries. 82 As will be demonstrated below: all these agreements provide for a gradual reduction of import duties on products over a specified period of time. Most of them grant immediate tariff-free access for Jordanian products into the markets of the trading partners. However, Jordan has not yet fully benefited from all these preferential market access opportunities. In fact, there are arguments indicating that trade diversions have taken place. 85 Jordan's inability to benefit fully from trade has also been facilitated by the fact that Jordan's production capacity of any one product is limited, and by the fact that very little development has actually taken place over the last decade. 86 The Government of Jordan continues to spearhead plans for further bilateral pacts with Iraq, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan, while also continuing to push for FTAs with MERCOSUR and Russia. 87 Moreover, in 2010, a Customs Union between Jordan and Egypt was first proposed, with the goal of establishing the Union by 2015. 88 While technical committees were established and bilateral meetings were held between the two sides, the generally known developments brought about by the Arab Spring rendered http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=732 (last visited Sep. 23, 2013, archived at http://perma.cc/3A32-W5EG).
84. Welcome to the Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS), supra note 
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the prospect of establishing a Customs Union, both bilaterally and at the Arab regional level, stalled indefinitely. During this period, Jordan also took part in another failed attempt at economic integration, for the same latter reasons, together with Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon, in hopes of establishing a regional free trade zone among the countries of the Mashreq. 89 Following the internal unrest arising from the Arab Spring, Jordan's past efforts to strengthen formal economic relations with the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) were positively welcomed in early 2011, when Jordan's almost fifteen-year-old request to join the economic bloc was accepted by the six oil-rich Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Bahrain). 90 However, the course changed, and members of the GCC no longer support full Jordanian membership in the GCC. 91 Instead, the proposal diverted to an aid support initiative-unsurprisingly for the already loose alliance. 92 But in any event, in the authors' view, Jordan does not need full membership in the GCC. Jordan's core interests at this stage are the following: facilitated access to the GCC labor market, which may be treated within a separate labor movement agreement for skilled and highly skilled workers; 93 financial and monetary aid packages for alleviating the pressures on the budget deficit; (2011), archived at http://perma.cc/LLP6-3XE6. The GCC countries are parties to GAFTA, giving preferential access to Jordanian-originating goods. Id.
93. Labour Markets Integration Agreements provide that the GATS shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to an agreement establishing full integration of the labour markets between or among the parties to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement: (a) exempts citizens of parties to the agreement from requirements concerning residency and work permits; [and] (b) is notified to the Council for Trade in Services. GATS, supra note 11, art. 5 (internal citation omitted) (alteration added). Footnote to the Article further states that "[t]ypically, such integration provides citizens of the parties concerned with a right of free entry to the employment markets of the parties and includes measures concerning conditions of pay, other conditions of employment and social benefits." GATS, supra note 11, art. 5, at n.2 (alteration added). Note also here that the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement clearly provides that the GATS "shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis." GATS, supra note 11, at 1189. [Vol. 24:2 and preferential oil and gas prices. 94
IV. JORDAN'S FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

A. Jordan-EU Association Agreement (towards the Euromed Free Trade Area)
The European Union (EU) is a significant user of FTAs in the framework of region-to-region negotiations. The EU utilizes free trade arrangements in combination with other policies and agreements to promote economic, political and security considerations. 95 In general, the EU's bilateral and regional arrangements not only cover a range of new issues at deeper depths than traditional FTAs, but they are distinctively European in that they promote the EU model of integration, using legal linkages and tieins to encourage regional integration among and between the partner countries, while simultaneously pushing for harmonization with the acquis communautaire. 96 The EU's "Southern Mediterranean Region" includes Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, 97 the Palestine Authority, and Turkey. 98 The trade relations between the EU and these countries are managed by the "Euromed Partnership," 99 [Vol. 24:2
AAs are organized according to three pillars. 106 The first is political, an essential element of which is the respect for human rights and democracy, an element that also provides for political dialogue. 107 The second is the economic and financial pillar, pursuant to which free trade in goods (industrial and agricultural) is to be established between the EU and the Med Partner in accordance with WTO rules over a transitional period, which may last up to 12 years. 108 Trade in services is also to be gradually liberalized. 109 They include maintenance of a high level of protection for intellectual property rights, gradual liberalization of public procurement, adjustment of provisions relating to competition, state aid and monopolies, provisions on the liberalization of capital movements, and economic cooperation in a wide range of sectors. 110 Under the third pillar of social and cultural cooperation, the AAs contain provisions on workers' rights and other social matters, as well as for the readmission of nationals and nonnationals illegally arriving in the territory of one party from that of another. 111 The AAs also provide for EU financial assistance for the Med Partner(s), except Israel. 112 The AAs also include procedures for the resolution of disputes relating to the application or interpretation of the Association Agreement. 113 The Jordan-EU Association Agreement (AA) was signed in 1997, and it came into force on May 1, 2002 (prior to that Jordan's and the EU's (then among the peoples of the region and the development of a free and flourishing civil society. 114 Under the AA, an Association Council (headed by Jordan's Minster of Foreign Affairs) is established, as the political arm for cooperation with the power to amend certain provisions or arrangements (such as progressive tariff dismantlement schemes and amendments to the rules of origin (ROO)). 115 An Association Committee (headed by Jordan's Secretary General of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation) is also established as the technical arm for cooperation in addition to an institutionalized Economic Dialogue. 116 The EU is also pursuing the establishment of a more efficient dispute settlement mechanism for the trade provisions of the Association Agreements. 117 In this context regional negotiations were formally launched at the fifth Euro-Med Trade Ministerial Conference held in Marrakech on March 24, 2006. 118 Jordan signed a Dispute Settlement Protocol in Brussels in June 2011, which created a dispute settlement process inspired by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, replacing the less reliable diplomatic approach contained in Article 101 of the Jordan-EU AA, though only as related to trade issues. 119 At the ninth Jordan-EU Association Council meeting held in Brussels on October 26, 2010, the EU agreed to grant Jordan the "Advanced Status," a designation that indicates closer ties in all areas; this includes deeper integration, which goes beyond removing tariffs to cover other issues of economic integration, investment, government procurement, and regulatory issues. 120 Negotiations for the further liberalization of trade in services pursuant to article 40 of the AA will be embedded in the context of a comprehensive free trade area. 121 Additionally, these negotiations will pursue the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance [Vol. 24:2 (ACAA), which is an agreement entailing regulatory convergence in line with EU standards on industrial products. 122 On the sectoral level, Jordan and the EU have entered into a number of bilateral arrangements to enhance cooperation in energy, aviation, and air management. 123 Furthermore, towards the achievement of the Euromed Free Trade Area, Jordan has entered into bilateral agreements with all the Euromed partners. 124 The agreements with the EU cover issues such as intellectual property, competition, state aid, government procurement and dispute settlement, and related institutional provisions at the political and technical levels that are central to the management and progression of the partnerships. 125 In this Article we have elected to offer a snapshot of the Rules of Origin (ROOs) and Services.
Rules of Origin (ROOs)
ROOs have an important role within FTAs. Simply put, ROOs specify the origin of traded goods, thus countries can determine the goods which should or should not benefit from free trade rules. This eligibility mechanism would prevent "Trade Deflection." 126 126. The creation of preferential trade areas "normally leads to the expansion of trade between its members, but economic theory postulates that a share of the increased trade experienced by participants is merely due to a redirection of their trade, and not increased trade due to the arrangement. This effect can be demonstrated convincingly in models. In practice, trade diversion has always been very difficult to isolate because of other factors. These include technological innovation, global reduction in tariffs, changes in investment policies, etc." See DICTIONARY OF TRADE POLICY TERMS, supra note 1.
Euromed partnership, ROOs are central to the establishment of the Euromed free trade area, and the AAs include agreed-upon ROOs in the form of Protocols attached to each agreement. 127 Initially, however, the AA ROO protocols of the Med Partners were not harmonized. "For example, the ROOs applicable to the [AAs] with Egypt and Jordan were virtually identical to the Pan-European rules, whereas the agreements with Morocco and Tunisia were slightly different for certain product categories." 128 The Pan-European ROOs model emerged in the 1990s as an effort to harmonize the origin rules embedded in the EU's different/various FTAs. 129 In 1994, the European Commission (EC) submitted a report presenting a strategy for harmonizing the preferential ROOs to reduce the underutilization of trade preferences and to maximize the gains from trade in a European context. 130 , archived at http://perma.cc/RHK8-G72U. The EU is the only regional bloc that also adopted a common set of non-preferential ROOs. System of Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Cumulation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (last updated July 27, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_783_en.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/3PM7-JLYD. "Goods whose production involved more than one country shall be deemed to originate in the country where they underwent their last, substantial, economically justified processing or working in an undertaking equipped for that purpose, and resulting in the manufacture of a new product or representing an important stage of manufacture. This basic concept is interpreted into process criterion, percentage criterion, or combination of these two criteria in determining the country of origin. The importance of the EU non-preferential rules of origin lay down specific rules on a product-specific basis reflecting the EU's interest such as radios, televisions, tape recorders, integrated circuits, photocopiers, and textiles and clothing." Id. at 16. The EU now applies its MFN tariff to only nine trading partners. These include: Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and the US. in Palermo on July 7, 2003, the decision was taken to replace the ROOs protocols contained in the previously adopted AAs, with the "Pan-Euro-Mediterranean protocol on rules of origin." 131 Since then, the Pan-Euro-Med Protocol has been available for the progressive adoption by the Med Partners. 132 Jordan adopted the Protocol in 2006. 133 The creation of the Pan-Euro-Med ROOs, through the extension of the Pan-Euro zone to the Med Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, and the Faroe Islands), allows for diagonal cumulation between these territories. 134 This means that goods consisting of components made in more than one participating country are treated in the same way as domestically produced goods. In other words, material can be sourced and manufactured in a number of countries within the Pan-Euro-Med cumulation area without the finished product losing the benefit of preferential customs tariffs when it enters the country of destination. 135 However, the generalization of the system of diagonal cumulation requires the fulfillment of the following three conditions: (i) FTAs with identical ROOs should be in place between both the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries; (ii) among these countries, all administrative procedures have to be harmonized; and (iii) all draw-back provisions should be withdrawn. 136 Additionally, materials and products must have acquired originating status by the application of rules of origin identical to those given in this Protocol. 137 The conditions aim at ensuring that a set of harmonized 
Services
The EU-MED agreements contain rendezvous clauses for the liberalization of trade in services. 147 The Jordan-EU Association Agreement contains a more sophisticated chapter on "services and right of establishment" vis-a-vis other Med Partners' AAs, which are generally limited to the provision on simply pursuing services liberalization. 148 press-release_MEMO-12-336_en.htm?locale=en, archived at http://perma.cc/AXL3-FQ43. regional plurilateral trade agreement. 157 In February 2004, this FTA was signed in Rabat and entered into force in July 2006. 158 The Agreement creates an integrated market of over "100 million people with a combined domestic product of nearly €150 billion." 159 It aims at the total elimination of customs tariffs, the harmonization of laws in economic matters, invigoration of trade exchanges, promotion of industries, stimulating economic activities and employment, and improving productivity and living standards. 160 Moreover, the Agreement covers services. 161 The ROOs adopted by the Agadir Agreement are the Pan-Euro-Med ROOs, which allow for diagonal cumulation between the Agadir countries and the EU. 162 The Agadir ROOs protocol is identical to the Pan-Euro-Med protocols of the AAs, save in one aspect related to the government agency authorized to issue the proof of origin. 163 Article (16) of Annex II to the Agadir Agreement provides that the Certificate of Origin (CO) may be issued by the "customs authority or the relevant authorized government authority," while under the Pan-Euro-Med procedure, such proof of origin may only be issued by the customs authority. 
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targeted products such as beverages and tobacco on which tariff protection levels are generally maintained. 167 The Agreement contains bilateral agreement on agricultural products between Jordan and the individual EFTA states. 168 With respect to ROOs incorporated into the Jordan-EFTA FTA, they are the standardized European rules of the Pan-Euro-Med ROOs, granting diagonal cumulation in the same manner as the Agadir Agreement. 169 Article 28 on services and investment provides that, in the context of the Euro-Med integration, the parties will cooperate, with the aim of services liberalization and promoting investment. 170 However, services negotiations have gone nowhere thus far. 171
D. Jordan-Turkey FTA
The Jordan-Turkey FTA was signed in December 2009 and entered into force in March 2011. 172 This Agreement, also applying the Pan-Euro-Med ROOs, covers goods trade and initiates a gradual reduction of tariffs over twelve years. 173 However, the FTA contains quotas and an extensive negative list of goods not benefiting immediately from the agreed preferential tariff. 174 Article 36 of the Agreement envisions the possible future liberalization of trade in services, taking into account the GATS as well as ongoing negotiations within the WTO. 175 Article 48 provides for a dispute settlement procedure that is political in nature but includes the establishment of a three-member tribunal and offers the complaining party the right to take measures. 176 At the Arab regional level, Jordan is a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA), which covers full liberalization of trade in goods among the seventeen Arab League member states (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen). 178 With regard to the ROOs, GAFTA states decided to adopt more stringent origin rules stemming from the desire, as well as the need, to confront trade deflection, and these rules are envisioned to be part of the work plan for establishing the free trade area. 179 The adoption of GAFTA ROOs Protocols is based on the Pan-Euro-Med Model. 180 Regarding services, in 2003, the Arab League Social and Economic Council approved Draft General Provisions. 181 However, except for Jordanian-Egyptian bilateral offers to liberalize three services sectors (computer, education, and telecommunications), little progress has been made.
F. Jordan-US FTA
The Jordan-US FTA was signed in October 2000 and entered into force in December 2001. 182 The Agreement was the United States' fourth free trade agreement and its first ever with an Arab state. 183 The FTA provides for significant and extensive liberalization across a wide spectrum of trade issues; it eliminates all tariff and non-tariff barriers to bilateral trade in virtually all industrial goods and agricultural products within ten years. 184 Electronic commerce is explicitly covered in the Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, whereby both parties are committed to promoting a 
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liberalized trade environment for electronic commerce that should encourage investment in new technologies and stimulate the innovative use of networks to deliver products and services. 185 "Both countries agreed to avoid imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions, [to avoid] imposing unnecessary barriers to market access for digitized products, and [to avoid] impeding the ability to deliver services through electronic means." 186 A separate Memorandum of Understanding on Transparency in Dispute Settlement was also established. 187 The Agreement also deals, inter alia, with intellectual property, trade in services, electronic commerce, government procurement and dispute settlement, as well as environmental and labor issues. 188 In this Article, the novel issue of labor and the issue of rules of origins will be highlighted.
Labor
Specific legal features of the Agreement include labor provisions within the body of the FTA, which not only reaffirm the parties' respect and enforcement of core labor standards, but also support this reaffirmation by a dispute settlement process. 189 In May 2006, the National Labor Committee issued a report 190 stating that foreign workers in the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) were forced to work long and arduous shifts in unhealthy conditions while being paid below-poverty wages. 191 At the same time, employers were withholding workers' paychecks and passports, in effect [Vol. 24:2 making them virtual prisoners and slave workers. 192 Put differently, that report and others like it accused Jordan of ignoring its responsibilities under the FTA and claim the United States has done little to nothing to enforce the labor provision of the Agreement. 193 The issue of trade and core labor standards has been the subject of intense debate both among and within certain WTO member governments. 194 The proposal to bring labor standards within the WTO rules and disciplines is a controversial one, in which no clear consensus exists among the WTO Members. 195 In the alternative, proponents of the WTO proposal to include core labor standards within the WTO's competences have moved to build labor provisions that aim to promote and protect workers' rights into the fabric of their trade agreements. 196 Article 6 of the Jordan-US FTA is such a provision. 197 The obligations placed on Jordan are two-fold: the first is to adopt or modify its domestic labor laws and regulations in line with Jordan's international obligations and internationally recognized core labor rights. 198 The second is to enforce its labor laws and not to relax domestic legal enforcement in favor of encouraging trade with the other party. 199 The FTA allows all violations of the Agreement, including labor rights, to be remedied through "appropriate and commensurate 195. Id. (at the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 1996, the issue was taken up and addressed in the Ministerial Declaration. At Singapore, Ministers stated: "We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labor standards. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labor standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration."). The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other labor matters determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand that a Party is in compliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources. 206 This subparagraph asserts the right of each state party to make decisions as such party may find appropriate in its discretion, concerning, inter alia, the adoption of procedures to maintain the internationally accepted standards. In response to the above-referenced report, the Jordanian Ministry of Labor took emergency administrative measures and put into place a strategic plan to ensure the enforcement of the labor laws and regulation in the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan. 207 
Rules of Origin
The ROOs contained in the Jordan-U.S. FTA, as set out in Annex 2.2, have three origin criteria. 208 First, is a wholly obtained/substantial transformation requirement, which means that goods imported to either Party must be made entirely in one of the FTA countries, or, if any thirdcountry materials are used, those materials must be "substantially transformed" into Jordan-U.S. origin products as a result of a manufacturing or processing operation. 209 For textile and apparel products, the FTA has a special set of "substantial transformation" rules. 210 Second, is the 35 percent domestic content requirement, which indicates that 35 percent of the customs value of the imported product must be attributable to Jordanian or US-origin materials and/or to direct costs of processing carried out in the FTA partner. 211 However, the cost or value of either Jordanianorigin materials or US-origin materials incorporated in the imported product can be counted in the other country, but only up to 15 percent of the customs value of the good. 212 And third, is the direct transport requirement, which is intended to ensure that qualifying goods are not mixed with nonqualifying goods while en route to Jordan or the United States. 213 Compared to the European Union approach, the origin criteria for gaining preferential treatment under the Jordan-US FTA are straightforward. While the United States has embraced, adopted, or utilized scheme is a special free trade zone established pursuant to Section 9 of the United States-Israel Free Trade Area implementation Act of 1985, Proclamation No. 6955 of the President of the United States of America and approved by the US Congress. Id. The first QIZ in Jordan was established in 1996 as a method to support the Middles East peace process through strengthen economic ties between Jordan and Israel and as such allows for tariff and quota free imports into the US market of goods. Id. To qualify, goods produced in these zones must contain a small portion of Israeli input set at 8 percent and Jordanian input of at least 11.7 percent. Id. In addition, a minimum 35 percent value added to the finished product. Id. The scheme has contributed significantly increasing Jordan's exports to the US primarily however in apparel goods with mainly Asia investors. Id. The QIZs offered a window of opportunity, the utility and sustainability of which is in question given the elimination since 2010 of tariffs under the Jordan these ROOs in other FTAs, it does not adopt a unification approach in its use of preferential ROOs. 214 These ROOs are special and may be explained by political and developmental considerations that the US has for Jordan. Moreover, these ROOs are substantially compatible with the application of the rules on the overall US economy. 215 Finally, it is to be noted that these simple ROOs are also used under the Agreement of Trading and Economic Cooperation between Jordan and Israel, signed in October 1995. 216 The Agreement aims at encouraging economic and commercial cooperation between the two countries and includes the reduction of customs tariffs on products of both countries. 217 In 2005 the Agreement was upgraded by including the Pan-Euro-Med ROOs, which allow for diagonal cumulation of origin, making this Agreement-to the knowledge of the authors-the only agreement to have two separate and co-existing systems of ROOs, leaving it to a trader's discretion to selectively use the set of ROOs that best suits its export and import requirements. 218
Intellectual Property
A central feature of the Jordan-US FTA is the WTO TRIPS-plus intellectual property rules. 219 Data exclusivity was a requirement of Jordan's accession to the WTO and was reflected in the Jordanian Trade [Vol. 24:2 Secrets and Unfair Competition Law, 220 which introduced a five-year data exclusivity period that commences on the medicine's date of registration in Jordan. 221 Under article 22 of the Jordan-US FTA, this period was further extended an additional three years for new uses of already known chemical entities. 222 According to several studies, these intellectual property obligations under the Jordan-US FTA have created obstacles to accessing new technologies in Jordan. 223 Given this result, the question is why Jordan has agreed to tie itself up in such harsh obligations. A likely explanation is that Jordan had both zero negotiating power with the US and lacked sufficient expertise in free trade dynamics at the time the Agreement was negotiated.
The Substantive Clause
Another intriguing legal feature is the "substantive clause" found in article 10 of the Jordan-US FTA, which provides that safeguards may be taken when increased quantities of imports are a substantial cause of serious injury or present a threat of serious injury to domestic industries. 224 A substantial cause is defined as "important and not less than any other cause." 225 This is not different from the standard contained in the WTO Safeguards Agreement, which permits the use of safeguard measures when increased imports cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry. 226
G. Jordan-Singapore FTA
The Jordan-Singapore FTA was concluded in May 2004 and came into force in August 2005. 227 The FTA eliminates tariffs on all goods (excluding 2.4 percent of Jordan tariff lines) within ten years from entry into force at an asymmetrical manner over a five-to-ten-year period. 228 The Agreement also allows for the creation of new goods export opportunities to other markets by applying a diagonal cumulation of origin with countries that have an FTA with both Jordan and Singapore, namely the European Free Trade Agreement and the United States. 229 The fourth chapter deals with trade-in Services. It ensures that service suppliers in Jordan and Singapore are guaranteed access to each other's markets. 230 Some examples of service-related sectors benefitting from the Agreement are computer and related services, educational services, research and development services, and services incidental to manufacturing and convention services. 231 The Agreement provides for further liberalization in a number of services sectors by both parties exceeding current liberalization pace within the scope of the WTO. 232 With the aim of attracting joint investments, Jordan offers extra liberalization for Singaporean services providers for research and development in fields of natural, social, and human sciences; in advertising services; and in services incidental to manufacturing, convention services, and water treatment services. 233 Conversely, Singapore also offers extra liberalization for Jordanian services providers in a number of sectors. The most important of these are computer and related services and research and development services in the fields of natural, social, and human sciences; advertising services; management consultancy services; real estate services; renting and leasing without operators; technical testing and analysis; and building cleaning, photography, and packaging services. 234 "The [A]greement also addresses cooperation in financial and transport services of all forms (sea, road, and air) between the two countries." 235 228. See id. Annex II, archived at http://perma.cc/H87G-VHXP ("2. Aside from products listed in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Annex, customs duties and any other charges having equivalent effect on products originating in Singapore and exported directly into Jordan shall remain at base rates for the first five years of implementation. Thereafter, beginning January 1 of year six from date of entry into force of the Agreement, the rates of duty shall be progressively abolished in five equal annual stages over five consecutive years. Such goods shall be duty-free effective January 1 of year ten.") 229. See generally id.; COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT, REVISION: FACTUAL PRESENTATION: FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN JORDAN AND SINGAPORE (GOODS AND SERVICES), WT/REG215/2/Rev.1, 9, tbl.III.1A (2008 Chapter 5 of the FTA with Singapore also contains obligations relating to electronic commerce in which each party agrees to forego deviating from its existing practices of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions, imposing unnecessary barriers on electronic transmissions, including digitized products, and impeding the supply through electronic means of services subject to a commitment under Chapter 4. 236 Jordan and Singapore have a Bilateral Investment Treaty that came into force on August 22, 2005. 237
H. Jordan-Canada FTA
Jordan and Canada signed a Free Trade Agreement in June 2009 that came into force in October 2012, together with a Labour Cooperation and Environment Agreement that came into force at the same time. 238 The FTA allows Jordan to export goods, tax-free, to Canada, and it allows Canadian firms to export to Jordan, thereby increasing competition. 239 The ROOs set out in this Agreement are based on altering harmonized system codes that take into account the comparative advantage and competitive capabilities of local industries, 240 which is an easy method when compared with other preferential ROOs.
The Agreement establishes a free trade area in goods only, and as such does not cover services liberalization. 241 In Chapter 3 on electronic commerce, parties agree not to apply customs duties to products delivered electronically. 242 The FIPA is a common feature in Canada's free trade deals. 245 In the Jordanian case, specifically, the FIPA was strangely imbalanced and biased to offer Canadian investors in Jordan more rights and privileges than domestic investors, including the Jordanian government. 246 For instance, the Canada-Jordan FIPA's dispute settlement mechanism allows Canadian investors to forgo the domestic judicial system (whether courts or arbitration) and refer to international arbitration if there has been any alleged breach of treaty protection. 247 Of course, international arbitrators might show bias in favor of international investors and influential states such as Canada. 248 This has particular importance especially if the dispute concerns public policy matters such as public order, health, and environment. Furthermore, the FIPA has clauses that protect against indirect expropriation. 249 In other words, if a domestic law or a regulation undermines the value of a foreign investment, compensation could be ruled for. In such case, and because a country generally cannot be forced to amend laws, an international arbitration panel may impose exaggerated compensation. 250 This is probably a standard Canadian FIPA that applies to all of its preferential partners. Likewise, Jordan's FIPA with Canada does not on its face favor Canada; rather, it is a de facto imbalance in favor of the developed and more capable partner in the equation. 251 However, Jordan could have insisted on keeping local adjudication an option and mitigated the language that provides for compensation on the so-called "regulatory expropriation." 252 [Vol. 24:2 PART V. LESSONS LEARNED ON JORDAN'S REGIONALIZATION Developing countries face challenges arising from the increasing number of RTAs. 253 This is particularly true for a small country like Jordan, strategically situated in an unstable region of the world, in which political consideration drives much of Jordan's national socioeconomic measures and its international relations. This increased number of RTAs possibly will disturb Jordan's decision-making process with respect to its options in multilateral, regional, and preferential trade. Nevertheless, the basic economic premise of comparative advantage remains valid. As evidenced by Jordan's case, trade openness alone does not and cannot generate economic growth. However, the linkages between a country's external trade policy and its international obligations, namely how they properly reflect the national economic framework (legal and otherwise) and whether they are supported by national economic development projects, are key to benefitting from the possibilities that RTAs offer.
Jordan's choice of trade partners clearly shows a variety in both the levels of development (Jordan has both south-south and north-south RTAs) and geographic proximity (ranging from the Americas to Asia). 254 The reasons that might explain this mixed selection of Jordan's RTA partners are to a large extent rooted in political considerations. The economic merits of these RTAs (current or planned) for a small and troubled economy such as Jordan's are essentially based on the traditional premise that such agreements provide trade advantages that allow for improved competitiveness and better insertion into the international economy. 255 An examination of the nineteen-page National Foreign Trade Strategy and its annexes reveals an overly simple text with limited analyses, a list of actions and/or goals more resembling a policy note, and provisions that can ultimately be described as containing procedural rather than targeted measures intended to stimulate growth. 256 With respect to Jordan's regionalization, the strategy reaffirms the current course, and clearly provides for the "entering into bilateral trade agreements" (objective 4/1) and "the active involvement in the multilateral negotiations in the framework of the WTO, the Arab League and the Organization of the [Vol. 24:2 capabilities (such as a young, educated workforce and technological openness) needed to move forward. 270 While Jordan's industrial policy continues to develop, largely pushed by international and other donors, its government continues to suffer, generally due to limited financial resources, high nepotism, and deep corruption. 271 Additionally, other non-economic but equally vital elements such as limited capacities and expertise, shortage or lack of updated or accurate data, as well as short-term private interests weigh heavily on the overall economic planning process. 272 The idea of international trade as advocated by Ricardo and Viner was predicated on the comparative advantage theory. 273 Both scholars found that free good exchange offers reciprocal economic benefits. 274 When each party in trade specializes in producing the product at which it excels, each party will obtain the other's at a lower cost while still efficiently producing their own. 275 But to apply this theory correctly, Jordan has to excel by specializing in producing certain goods and services. Jordan also must be mindful of certain clauses under its FTA commitments, such as the investment clause in its agreement with Canada and the intellectual property commitments under its agreement with the US. If Jordan cannot amend burdensome clauses in its FTAs, then remedying actions must take place to rectify the negatives. For instance, if Jordan cannot revisit its agreement with the US with respect to intellectual property clauses, it should allocate more resources and spending on public health and technology to "offset the
